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The Copyright Exception for Derivative
Works and the Scope of Utilizationt
CAROL A. ELLINGSON*
It has long been recognized that the author of an original copyrighted
work may choose to exploit his work by transferring rights to produce
and distribute a new "derivative work" based on the author's original
work.1 It has also long been recognized that the derivative work created
under such a transfer may itself be copyrighted separately.2 The recent
revision to the Copyright Act' continues to recognize the derivative work4
tCopyright 1979 by Carol A. Ellingson. All rights reserved.
*B.A. 1970, M.A. 1973, University of Minnesota; J.D. 1979, Harvard University.
Associate of Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard and Donnelly, St. Paul, MN. This article
tied for third place in the 1979 National Nathan Burkan Competition, sponsored by the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
' The Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17
U.S.C. §§ 1-32, 101-116, 201-216 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as 1909 Act] does not use the term
"derivative works" but refers to "new works" in § 7 which provides: "Compilations or
abridgements, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations, translations, or other versions of
works in the public domain or of copyrighted works when produced with the consent of the
proprietor of the copyright in such works . .. shall be regarded as new works subject to
copyright under the provisions of this title." The term "derivative work," rather than "new
work," was preferred by commentators. See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 39, at 165-66
(1976).
2 1909 Act, supra note 1, § 7.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1976
Act].
The term "derivative work" is used in the 1976 Act and is defined as
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consist-
ing of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative
work."
1976 Act, supra note 3, § 101. Section 106 states that the owner of a copyright has the ex-
clusive right to authorize the preparation of derivative works based on the copyrighted
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and the right to a new copyright in it.5 Under both the 1909 Act and the
1976 Act, the derivative work copyright is thought to protect only that
new material contributed by the producer of the derivative work.6
A problem with this system can arise if, after a derivative work has
been prepared, the copyright proprietor of the underlying work' termi-
nates the transfer of rights to produce and distribute the derivative
work.' The question becomes whether the proprietor of the underlying
work may veto any further exploitation of the derivative work by with-
drawing his permission to use the underlying material. Under the 1909
Act, a copyright could be renewed after the initial twenty-eight year
term and, under certain circumstances, any transfer of rights for the
renewal term could be terminated upon expiration of the initial term.'
Under the 1976 Act, the renewal system was abandoned but new termi-
nation of transfer provisions"° were enacted to permit any transfer of
rights under copyright to be terminated after a fixed period of time.11
The 1976 Act includes an express exception permitting the continued
"utilization" of the underlying work after such a termination for deriva-
tive works prepared under the authority of a grant from the proprietor
of the underlying work. 2 In addition, a recent Second Circuit decision'3
recognized a judicial derivative works exception similar to that ex-
pressed in the 1976 Act.
Although the termination of transfer provisions, the 1976 Act's statu-
tory derivative works exception and the Second Circuit's judicial excep-
tion have been the subject of scholarly review recently, 4 relatively little
work, to distribute copies of the copyrighted work and to perform the copyrighted work
publicly. Id. § 106. Section 201 authorizes the transfer of any of the exclusive rights com-
prised in a copyright, including those specified by § 106. Id- § 201(d)(2).
s Id § 103.
' See, e.g., Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971) (1909 Act); 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 103.
7 The term "underlying work" is used herein to mean the pre-existing work upon which
a derivative work is based.
' "Derivative work" is used herein to mean a work which so substantially copies an
underlying work that it would be deemed an infringing work but for the fact that the copy-
right proprietor of the pre-existing work consented to the derivative use (or the underlying
work has entered the public domain). See 1 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (1980).
' See notes 24-25 & accompanying text infra.
10 1976 Act, supra note 3, §§ 203, 304.
" See notes 46-85 & accompanying text infra.
12 1976 Act, supra note 3, §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6); see notes 169-86 & accompanying text
infra.
"' Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977);
see text accompanying notes 135-46 infra.
1 See, e.g., Curtis, Caveat Emptor in Copyright: A Practical Guide to the Termination-
of-Transfers Provisions of the New Copyright Code, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 19 (1977);
Nimmer, Termination of Transfer Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 947
(1977); Nolan, A Brighter Day for the Magic Lantern. Thoughts on the Impact of the New
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attention has been given to the scope of the derivative.works exception
and to whether the uses possible under the exception affect its interpre-
tation. This derivative works exception is potentially a powerful device
for protecting derivative work proprietors as well as for implementing
the copyright policy interest in making creative works and ideas pub-
licly available. It is the thesis of this article that, even in construing the
previous copyright statute which contained no express derivative works
exception, the courts have been sensitive both to the position of the
nature of the uses contemplated and to the public interest.
This article examines, first, the devices for terminating a transfer of
the right to use an underlying work in a derivative work. Second, the ar-
ticle discusses the effect of termination on the exploitation of derivative
works as judicially worked out under the 1909 Act's renewal provisions
and as statutorily expressed in the 1976 Act. These first two sections
seek to elucidate those policies motivating the judicial and legislative
solutions.'5 Finally, some specific underlying rights typically acquired
for use in a theatrical motion picture18 will be examined to determine
whether or not each will fall within the derivative works exception. The
question at issue, ultimately, is: How can a derivative work be exploited,
after rights to the underlying work have been terminated, without in-
fringing the copyright in the underlying work? The conclusion advanced
is that judicial opinions have consistently relied on distinctions between
the termination devices employed and between the use of the derivative
work contemplated to achieve a practical balance between the conflict-
ing policies of author protection and public access. Since these distinc-
tions were included in the 1976 Act, an understanding of their emer-
gence and articulation is essential for any future development of the
derivative works exception.
Copyright Act on Motion Pictures, 11 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1 (1977); Stein, Termination of
Transfers and Licenses Under the New CopyrightAct. Thorny Problems for the Copyright
Bar, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1141 (1976); Note, Derivative Copyright and the 1909 Act-New
Clarity or Confusion?, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 905 (1978); Note, Rohauer v. Killiam Shows,
Inc. and the Derivative Work Exception to the Termination Right: Inequitable Anomalies
Under Copyright Law, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 635 (1979).
15 A detailed analysis of the workings of the termination provisions beyond that neces-
sary to understand the scope of the derivative works exception will not be attempted.
" The House Report accompanying the 1976 Act discusses the derivative works excep-
tion in terms of motion pictures. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 127, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5742 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]. There-
fore, it seems particularly appropriate for the purposes of this article. Furthermore, it is
with respect to motion pictures that litigation is most likely to arise; not only do movie pro-
ducers absorb a large number of underlying works, but the sums of money involved in the
resulting product also make litigation worthwhile.
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TERMINATING CONSENT TO USE AN UNDERLYING WORK
IN A DERIVATIVE WORK
A copyright owner must consent to use of his copyrighted work in a
derivative work. 7 Such consent may be terminated either by contract or
by operation of law.
By Contract
By contract, the owner of a pre-existing work may grant the rights to
create a derivative work for only a limited time. Under the 1909 Act, an
author was permitted to grant for a limited period 8 either a license 9 or
an assignment.0 In addition, it is clear that Congress intended that the
1976 Act would not only eliminate the notion of indivisibility of copy-
right,2 ' but would also permit a copyright owner to limit contractually
the duration of grants to use his work.' Contractual limitations on the
duration of a grant are frequently seen in the various contracts by
which movie producers acquire rights."
1 See notes 1-5 & accompanying text supra.
" Under the 1909 Act, supra note 1, the bundle of rights comprising a copyright was
thought to be indivisible because the Act referred to a single "copyright." 2 M. NIMMER,
supra note 1, § 119.1. Consequently a transfer of the entire bundle of rights was referred to
as an assignment, and a transfer of anything less was a license. Id. Duration, however, was
not thought to be an element of indivisibility. Kaminstein, Divisibility of Copyright in 1
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 623, 635 (Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. ed. 1963).
19 See, e.g., Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); DeMille Co. v. Casey, 121
Misc. 78, 201 N.Y.S. 20 (Sup. Ct. 1923). See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 45.2; 18
C.J.S. Copyright & Literary Property § 86d, at 209 (1939).
1 G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 849 (1951).
2 See note 18 supra.
= Section 201(d) of the 1976 Act states that "[tihe ownership of a copyright may be trans-
ferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance." 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 201(d).
The House Report states that nothing in the 1976 Act is intended to prohibit contractual
grants for any limited period. H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 142. If an agreement provides for
a termination date earlier than that provided by statute or of a duration less than that per-
mitted by law, or if it allows the author the
right of cancelling or terminating the agreement under certain circumstances,
the duration is governed by the agreement. Likewise, nothing in this section
or legislation is intended to change the existing state of the law of contracts
concerning the circumstances in which an author may terminate a license,
transfer or assignment.
Id. Furthermore, if "an agreement does contain provisions governing its duration-for ex-
ample, a term of sixty years-and the author has not exercised his or her right of termina-
tion under the statute, the agreement will continue according to its terms-in this example,
for only sixty years." Id.
" For several such form contracts, see 1 J. TAUBMAN, PERFORMING ARTS MANAGEMENT
AND LAW 9-92 (1978); Stein, supra note 14, at 1162 & n.100.
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By Operation of Law
Renewal Under the 1909 Act
The second method by which the transfer of rights can be terminated
is by operation of law. Under the 1909 Act, the renewal system operated
to terminate some grants. During the last year of the initial twenty-
eight year term of copyright under the 1909 Act, an author is entitled to
renew and extend his copyright for a further term of twenty-eight
years.' If the author dies before renewal rights vest, section 24 entitles
certain statutory successors" to possession of the renewal term.
This system was thought to protect the author against improvident
sales of his copyright. 6 The House Committee report accompanying the
bill enacted as the 1909 Act stated:
Your committee ... decided that it was distinctly to the advantage of
the author to preserve the renewal period. It not infrequently hap-
pens that the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a
comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be a great success
and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your committee felt
that it should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal
term.'
The Supreme Court stated that the "basic policy consideration underly-
ing the renewal provision is to permit the author to sell his 'copyright'
without losing his renewal interest."' What was intended, it is clear,
was to give authors a "second chance"" to market their work again
after an initial period of exploitation.
It can be argued, though, that the renewal system was also meant to
serve the public interest by placing into the public domain many works
of only limited further value;"0 copyrights in such works are not re-
newed and the resulting duration of copyright in them is shorter than
that of more enduring works. Proponents of this view argue that a
work can continue to have scholarly, historical, or other value after
21 1909 Act, supra note 1, § 24.
1 Generally speaking, the author's surviving family, executor or next of kin are in-
cluded. Id.; see 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 115.
26 For a historical summary, see Note, Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. and the
Derivative Work Exception to the Termination Right Inequitable Anomalies Under
Copyright Law, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 635, 638-42 (1979).
" H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909), quoted in Ringer, Renewal of
Copyright in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 505, 517 (Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. ed. 1963).Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 653 (1943).
This "second chance" has been described by Curtis, supra note 14, at 20; Ringer, supra
note 27, at 188; Note, supra note 26, at 640.
" This argument is discussed by Ringer, supra note 27, at 187-88. She states that "about
15% of subsisting copyrights are being renewed." Id. at 187.
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its commercial value is gone [and] it hampers free cultural and in-
tellectual interchange to have great numbers of ephemeral and non-
commercial works tied up for long periods of time, when no one is in-
terested in asserting rights in them.1
The renewal provisions, then, illustrate the tension inherent throughout
copyright law. As the Supreme Court recently indicated:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like
the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work
is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ulti-
mately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's" creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good.'
An author's protection under renewal was weakened by the Supreme
Court's decision in Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons.' By
holding that an author may assign his renewal copyright before it has
vested and that such assignment will be binding on the author, the
Court refused to "impute to Congress the enactment of an absolute
statutory bar against assignments of authors' renewal interests."'
Fisher has been criticized as disadvantaging only the powerless
author. Authors who possess sufficient bargaining power to effect a
favorable contractual transfer of their copyright need not rely on termi-
nation of their transfer by operation of law. Professor Nimmer argues,
though, that most authors lack such bargaining power because the eco-
nomic value of their work has yet to be proven.36 As a result, most
authors will agree to assign their renewal rights along with the original
term in order to effect a sale.
Although Fisher retains vitality for transfers by an author who lives
until the renewal term vests, the Supreme Court decided in Miller
Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc.,' that when an assigning author
dies before commencement of the renewal period the renewal rights will
vest, not in the assignee, but in the section 24 successors, regardless of
the assignment. The Court stated that the renewal rights must be treated
as "expectancies until the renewal period arrives." 9 Consequently, until
"' Id. at 187-88.
' Twentieth Century Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
318 U.S. 643 (1943).
Id at 656.
See 2 M. NIMMER. supra note 8, § 9.06[B].
Id- § 9.02.
Sid.
3 362 U.S. 373 (1960).
" Id. at 377.
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the renewal period arrives, "assignees of renewal rights take the risk
that the rights acquired may never vest in their assignors. 4 ° The Court
said that this deprives the assignee of nothing because, "[l]ike all pur-
chasers of contingent interests, he takes subject to the possibility that
the contingency may not occur."41
The policy of permitting an author to recapture in the future some of
the increased value of his labor is, as a result of court interpretations of
the 1909 Act, effectuated only when the author dies before renewal. As
a result, producers of derivative works now regularly obtain assign-
ments of renewal expectancies from identifiable statutory successors
even before the author's death in order to protect themselves from
possible termination.42 As Professor Kaplan noted,43 it is difficult to de-
fend the distinction drawn between authors who live until the renewal
vests and, therefore, earn no increased value from their work and those
who die before renewal leaving the renewal term as a legacy." This
seems to operate "in a peculiarly perverse way where on the faith of a
transfer from the now-deceased author, the transferee has created a
'derivative work.' ,
45
Termination of Transfer Provisions Under the 1976 Act
In an effort to better effectuate the policy of protecting authors which
underlies the renewal provisions of the 1909 -Act, Congress enacted a
new termination of transfer system in the 1976 Act in sections 203 and
304. These provisions are
based on the premise that the reversionary provisions of the present
section on copyright renewal (17 U.S.C. sec. 24) should be eliminated,
and that the proposed law should substitute for them a provision safe-
guarding authors against unremunerative transfers. A provision of
this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of
authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a
work's value until it has been exploited.5
The termination provisions are intended to represent "a practical com-
promise that will further the objectives of the copyright law while
recognizing the problems and legitimate needs of all interests involved.
47
41 Id. at 378.
41 Id.
'" See Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 493 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
949 (1977); Nolan, supra note 14, at 27.
B. KAPLAN. AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (1967).
Id at 112.
5 1d.
" H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 124, 140.
7 Id- at 124.
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The 1976 Act substitutes a unitary copyright term,48 but confers on
authors a right, which may not be waived, to terminate transfers under
their copyrights after a specified period.49 Furthermore, recaptured
rights may not, generally speaking, be retransferred until the previ-
ously granted rights are effectively terminated.'
The right of termination in section 203 applies to any "exclusive or
nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license" of a copyright or any right
under a copyright "executed by the author on or after January 1,
1978."' The section 203(a) right of termination applies only to transfers
executed after the effective date of the 1976 Act; the provisions "have
no retroactive effect. '52 The right of termination under section 203 is
limited to inter vivos transfers executed by the author and does not
apply to transfers by the author's successors in interest, his statutory
successors or to bequests by the author.' A work made for hire is not
subject to the section 203 termination provision and termination of the
rights in such a work "may be effected notwithstanding any agreement
to the contrary, including an agreement ... to make any future grant."'
The right of termination cannot be waived. Since section 203(b)(4) pro-
vides that a subsequent grant of recaptured rights will be valid only if
made after the effective date of termination,55 the practice of accumu-
lating reversionary interests from potential statutory successors (here
statutory terminators) should be effectively forestalled.
A reversion of rights might, therefore, occur under section 203 as well
as under the renewal provisions of the 1909 Act with respect to some
works. Works originally protected under the 1909 Act will be subject to
section 203 with respect to grants executed after January 1, 1978 and
subject to termination under the 1909 Act's renewal provisions if in
their first term of copyright on January 1, 1978.6 The section 203 right
of termination may be exercised at any time during a five year period,
beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of
the grant.5 7 Termination may be exercised by the author, if living,- or
' This term endures for the life of the author, plus 50 years. 1976 Act, supra note 3, §
302(a).
" Id §§ 203, 304.
5 Id. §§ 203(b)(4), 304(c)(6)(D).
Id § 203(a)(5).
52 H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 125.
5 Id
' 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 203(a).
' There is one exception-a regrant of rights back to the original grantee may be valid
if made after notice of termination is given.
1976 Act, supra note 3, § 304(a).
s Id § 203(a)(3). Alternatively, if the grant "covers the right of publication of the work,"
the termination period begins 35 years after publication of the work under the grant or 40
years from execution of the grant, whichever term ends first. Id
I Id- § 203(a)(1).
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by enumerated statutory successors, if the author is dead.59 Special pro-
visions are set out for effecting termination of joint works."0
Termination is effected by serving a written notice in advance of the
effective date of termination. 1 Upon effecting termination, all rights
under the 1976 Act "covered by the terminated grants revert to the
author, authors, and other persons owning termination interests" under
sections 203(a)(1) and 203(a)(2).2 Procedures for making further grants of
the recaptured rights are set out in sections 203(b)(3), 203(b)(4) and
203(b)(5).' Section 203(b)(5) emphasizes that only rights arising under the
1976 Act are affected by the termination provisions and "rights arising
under any other Federal, State, or foreign laws" are unaffected.4 This
means that only rights under a United States copyright are subject to
termination. The final provision of section 203 states that unless termi-
nation is effected by the affirmative acts required under section 203(b)
the grant continues in effect for the full unitary term of copyright. 5
Section 304 of the 1976 Act outlines recapture provisions for copy-
rights existing on January 1, 1978. Copyrights in their first term on that
date are entitled to a renewal term which vests twenty-eight years after
the copyright was originally s~cured 6  This apparently means that the
renewal provisions under the 1909 Act govern the operation and effect
of renewals under this section;67 only the length of the renewal term is
altered by section 304(a)."
" The statutory terminators are the author's surviving spouse, children or grand-
children. Id- § 203(a)(2).
" Termination may be by a majority of the joint authors who executed the grant or, if
any joint author is dead, by that author's statutory terminators. Id § 203(a)(1).
"I Procedural requirements for effecting the termination are set out at id § 203(a)(4).
" Id- § 203(b). There is an express exception for derivative works prepared under the
terminated grant which allows them to continue to be utilized. Id. § 203(b)(1). For a full
discussion of the derivative works exception, see notes 169-87 & accompanying text infra.
' Section 203(b)(3), 1976 Act, supra note 3, requires that any further grant of recaptured
rights be executed by the same number and proportion of the owners as are required to ter-
minate the grant. Section 203(b)(4) requires that any further grant be made only after the
effective date of termination-except for regrants back to the original grantee. Section
203(b)(5) states that termination affects only rights under copyright.
8 Neither are these rights recaptured by operation of § 203. Id. § 203(b)(5).
0 Failure to affirmatively terminate the rights will not result in their continuation if the
grant itself provides otherwise. Id § 203(b)(6).
' Id. § 304(a).
'7 The 1976 Act does not expressly state that the 1909 Act's renewal'provisions will ap-
ply, but the House Report states that § 304(a)
reenacts and preserves the renewal provision, now in section 24 of the statute,
for all of the works presently in their first 28-year term. A great many of the
present expectancies in these cases are the subject of existing contracts, and
it would be unfair and immensely confusing to cut off or alter these interests.
H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 139.
"5 The renewal term is extended to 47 years, i.e., a 19 year extension of the 1909 Act's 28
year renewal term. 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 304(a).
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The term of copyright for any copyright already in its renewal term
on January 1, 1978 is extended to endure seventy-five years from the
date it was originally secured" 9-that is, for an extra nineteen years. A
right of termination for this nineteen year extension is granted in sec-
tion 304(c). 0 It permits transfers executed before the effective date of
the 1976 Act to be terminated fifty-six years after the date copyright
was originally secured; thereafter, transfers of the nineteen year exten-
sion will be permitted.
Section 304(c) contains provisions similar to those in section 203 with
respect to advance notice procedures," the content of terminable rights
(i.e., rights under copyright only),7' the vesting of termination rights73
and effectuation of further grants.74 Section 304 also provides, as does
section 203, that no waiver of termination rights will be effective,' 5 and,
unless termination is affirmatively exercised, a grant of rights will con-
tinue in effect for the full extended renewal term.7 '8 The two major dif-
ferences between sections 304 and 203 concern grants made by statu-
tory successors and grants executed by joint authors." A derivative
works exception identical to that in section 203(b)(1) is enacted in section
304(c)(6)(A). 8
"For Hire" Exception
Since under both Acts there is special treatment afforded to works
so Id. § 304(b).
,0 Id § 304(c). It was thought by Congress that:
The arguments for granting rights of termination are even more persuasive
under section 304 than they are under section 203; the extended term
represents a completely new property right, and there are strong reasons for
giving the author, who is the fundamental beneficiary of copyright under the
Constitution, an opportunity to share in it.
H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 140.
" 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 304(c)(4).
' M §§ 304(c)(6), 304(c)(6)(A).
Id- §§ 304(c)(6)(B)-(C).
Id. §§ 304(c)(6)(C)-(D).
Id. § 304(c)(5).
, Failure to affirmatively terminate the rights will not result in their continuation if the
grant itself provides otherwise. Id § 304(c)(6}(F).
77 See Stein, supra note 14, at 1158-59. The joint author differences are not relevant to
the problem at issue here. Section 203 only affects recapture of rights transferred by the
author after January 1, 1978. Section 304, however, permits termination of grants executed
by either the author or his statutory successors (ie., "beneficiaries of the author who can
claim renewal under the present [1909] law"). H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 140. This dif-
ference was enacted to permit those who had transferred binding renewal expectancies
under the 1909 Act to recapture and benefit from the extra 19 year period granted under
the 1976 Act. Id at 141. Some limitations on termination by statutory successors are
enacted in § 304(c)(1) and are not relevant here. See Stein, supra note 14, at 1157-58.
7' This exception is discussed in detail in notes 169-87 & accompanying text infra.
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made for hire, which has an impact on termination of grants, an exami-
nation of the "for hire" doctrine is necessary. First, both the 1909 and
the 1976 Acts treat the employer as the author for copyright purposes;79
this results in the copyright vesting initially in the employer and not
the employee who actually authored the work." Furthermore, under the
1909 Act, renewal rights to a work made for hire are not granted to the
author but to the copyright proprietor -ie., the employer and his suc-
cessors in interest." The termination of transfer provisions in the 1976
Act expressly exempt works made for hire." Thus, grants of rights in a
work made for hire are not terminable by operation of law under the
1976 Act. With respect to copyrights in their first term on January 1,
1978, the 1976 Act re-enacts the proprietor's entitlement to the renewal
term."
While detailed analysis of this doctrine is beyond the scope of this
article, it should be noted that the exemption for works made for hire
may have the unfortunate, and certainly unintended, result of causing
producers of such works as motion pictures to turn to even greater
use of material produced by employees or by specially commissioned
authors, instead of using previous works of independent authors.
There is also a risk that a purchaser intent on evading the termina-
tion provisions will attempt to convert a previously independent
author into an "employee for hire," either by hiring the author directly
or by persuading the author to set up his own production company,
which would then hire the author and license rights in the resulting
work to the purchaser"
Such rights would be perpetual, since they are exempted from the ter-
mination provisions. Even if such arrangements were determined to be
spurious and ineffective for evading termination,85 a premium will still
have been placed on legitimate employment arrangements. For exam-
ple, the work of motion picture directors or producers who write their
own scripts will be of increased value because those authors can legiti-
mately avoid termination provisions, and thus offer a complete package
of rights which are not terminable.
1909 Act, supra note 1, § 26; 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 201(b).
1976 Act, supra note 3, § 201(a). The 1909 Act creates a presumption of copyright in
the employer, and thus permits contractual arrangements to vest copyright in the
employee. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 62.1.
" 1909 Act, supra note 1, § 24.
1976 Act, supra note 3, §§ 203(a), 304(c).
U Id § 304(a).
Curtis, supra note 14, at 37.
See, e.g., Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn., Inc., 375 F.2d 639 (2d
Cir. 1967).
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CONTINUED UTILIZATION OF A DERIVATIVE
WORK AFTER TERMINATION"
Under the 1909 Act
Most commentators have stated that under the 1909 Act the owner of
a derivative work cannot continue to exploit his derivative work after
termination of rights to the underlying work, whether termination is by
operation of law or by contract." Professor Nimmer, for example,
asserts that any such continued use by the derivative work proprietor is
''contrary to the axiomatic copyright principle that a person may exploit
only such copyrighted literary material as he either owns or is licensed
to use."88 Another expert on the renewal section concurs, stating:
[I]f a motion picture company buys from an author all rights in a
novel, it may validly copyright the motion picture photoplay in its
own name and renew that copyright at the appropriate time. But if
the author dies prior to the time for renewal of the basic work, the
widow may renew this copyright and thus deprive the company of
any right to continue to release the photoplay during the renewal
term of the basic work.'
Another commentator proposes that further exploitation of the deriva-
tive work should be permitted, but conditioned on the payment of addi-
tional royalties." The courts, however, have not evidenced complete
agreement with the commentators.9 There are few cases on point, and
even the leading cases are not free from ambiguity on this issue. The
courts have taken two different approaches: One line of cases has held
that the right to exploit a derivative work does not survive the termina-
tion of the license to use the basic work. The other line of cases relies in-
stead on the "new property right" that springs into existence with the
derivative work to hold that continued utilization is permissible. A third
Hereinafter, the word "use" will be employed to connote a broad category of exploita-
tion devices; the word "utilization" will be employed to mean only those noninfringing uses
permitted under a derivative works exception. "Use," then, includes the subcategory
"utilization." "Transfer" is used to mean any "assignment, mortgage, exclusive license or
any other conveyance alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright" or of any right comprised
in a copyright. See 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 101.
", See, e.g., 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 3.07[A]; Bricker, Renewal and Extension of
Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 43 (1955); Ringer, supra note 27, at 169-70; Note,
Derivative Copyright and the 1909 Act-New Clarity or Confusion?, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV.
905, 921-23 (1978).
1 M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 3.07[A].
Bricker, supra note 87, at 43.
Note, supra note 26, at 637, 659-63.
Ringer notes that: "A problem that has thoroughly confused the courts in recent years
arises when a new version has been made and copyrighted under an assignment or license
that is no longer binding during the renewal term." Ringer, supra note 27, at 169.
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possible approach, which is consistent with the judicial decisions and
with the practical justifications underlying the decisions, emerges from
an analysis of the courts' opinions.
The Theory of Nonsurvival
The first case to find that no right to continued use existed after ter-
mination was Fitch v. Shubert.92 In that case, the Shuberts, prominent
theatrical producers, had acquired a license to produce a musical ver-
sion of the Clyde Fitch play Barbara Frietchie, The Frederick Girl in
1925. They obtained the license to the original term of the underlying
work's copyright, not from the author, who had died years earlier, nor
from a statutory successor, but from the Actors' Fund of America,
which had acquired the interest by bequest after Fitch's death." The
resulting derivative work was Sigmund Romberg's operetta, My Mary-
land, first produced in 1927. The original term of Fitch's copyright ex-
pired in 1928 and Fitch's next of kin applied for renewal. In 1937, the
next of kin sued the Shuberts for copyright infringement based on their
new production of the operetta. The court asserted that the Shuberts'
rights to use the Fitch play expired when the original term expired in
1928:
It is evident therefore that all rights which the defendants acquired
in 1925 to use the Fitch play as the basis of a musical operetta ex-
pired when the copyright for the original term expired in 1928 and
when a new grantee appeared as owner of the Fitch play for the re-
newal term.N
However, Fitch's next of kin was deemed to have licensed the rights to
the renewal term because, subsequent to renewal, he had granted the
Shuberts a performance license that specified no duration; by theatrical
custom, a license silent as to duration was thought to grant the full re-
maining term. The Shuberts were permitted to continue producing the
operetta.
The case involved a transfer of the original term only with renewal
vesting by operation of law in a statutory successor. The Shuberts had
not received any form of putative transfer of the renewal term before
its vesting; at the time of their license, the author was already dead and
the transferor owned rights only in the original term. The court, there-
fore, found that the Shuberts had no right to continue to utilize their
derivative work but for the next of kin's license; it was able to permit
20 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
" This fact does not clearly appear in the Fitch opinion, but is set out in Rohauer v.
Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
" 20 F. Supp. at 315.
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continued use of My Maryland by finding a license of the renewal term.
It was not necessary to terminate the right to perform the operetta.
The next and most frequently cited case expressing the idea that
rights to exploit a derivative work do not survive termination was G.
Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.95 That suit was brought to
determine which of the various holders of copyright interests in
Madame Butterfly had the right to authorize a motion picture of Puc-
cini's opera. 8 The opera was based both on John Luther Long's novel
Madame Butterfly97 and on David Belasco's play version of the novel. 8
In 1901, Long and Belasco granted exclusive rights to Ricordi to create
a libretto for an opera of the play. No renewal rights were covered by
this grant. The resulting Puccini opera was copyrighted in 1904 by
Ricordi and renewal rights were acquired from Puccini's son. Copyright
on Long's novel was renewed in 1925, but copyright on Belasco's play
was not renewed and it expired in 1945. In 1932, Paramount Pictures
was granted motion picture rights in both the novel and the play. The
case arose as a suit by Ricordi for judgment declaring that it owned mo-
tion picture rights in the opera. The court decided that Ricordi was not
entitled to movie rights because the copyright was "restricted to what
was copyrightable as new matter in its operatic version"9 9- not general
use of the underlying novel."°0
The opinion is somewhat vague. While there is language indicating
that the owner of a derivative work has no right to continue exploiting
his work after transfer of rights in the underlying work is terminated,"'
the actual holding of the case is limited to Ricordi's right to license a
further derivative work. The opinion does not state that Ricordi could
" 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951). The case is popularly referred
to as the "Madame Butterfly case."
" Different people held the copyright interests in the book, the play and the opera.
" The book was copyrighted as J. LONG, MADAME BUTTERFLY (1897).
The play version was written in 1900 with Long's consent.
189 F.2d at 471.
"' This is because § 7 expressly provides that a copyright on a derivative work does not
affect the "force or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any
part thereof," nor does it "imply an exclusive right to such use of the original works." 1909
Act, supra note 1, § 7.
10 The court says, for example:
It is true that the expiration of Long's copyright of the novel did not affect the
plaintiff's copyright of so much of the opera as was a "new work" and entitled
to be independently copyrighted as such. But the plaintiff has acquired no
rights under Long's renewal of the copyright on his novel and the plaintiff's
renewal copyright of the opera gives it rights only in the new matter which it
added to the novel and the play. It follows that the plaintiff is not entitled to
make general use of the novel for a motion picture version of Long's
copyrighted story; it must be restricted to what was copyrightable as new
matter in its operatic version.
189 F.2d at 471.
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not continue to license live performances of its opera or sell copies of its
score, merely that Ricordi could not "make general use of the story of
the novel for a motion picture version of its opera." ' The court was not,
of course, faced with the question of whether to prohibit further per-
formances of the opera. Nevertheless, one can read the case most broadly
to determine that "Ricordi was held to have lost the right to exploit the
underlying material as contained in the derivative work notwithstand-
ing the fact that the derivative work was created during a time when
Ricordi had a valid license from the owner of the underlying work."1 °3 It
would be more accurate to take the narrower view that Ricordi lost the
right to authorize a second generation derivative work °. based on its
first generation derivative work, notwithstanding the fact that the
derivative work was created when Ricordi had a valid license from the
owner of the underlying work.
It should also be noted that Ricordi did not lose its rights to the
underlying work through operation of the renewal provisions, but
because the agreement granting it rights to make the libretto was
limited by its own terms to the original term of copyright. Ricordi was
not denied the renewal rights by any operation of law; but by operation
of its own contract, it never received any renewal rights.
A recent case which seems to support a broad reading of Ricordi is
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc."'5 The question in that case was
whether the assignee of movie rights to the musical play Maytime could
authorize a television broadcast of its copyright film. The issue was not
whether the derivative work owner could continue to exhibit his movie
after the transfer of rights to the underlying work was terminated, but
rather whether the contract granting the derivative work proprietor
rights to the underlying work permitted a television performance. It
was not a case in which rights had been terminated, but a case to decide
if they ever had been granted at all. The court indicated that this ques-
tion involved a choice between
an approach that "a license of rights in a given medium (e.g., 'motion
picture rights') includes only such uses as fall within the unambiguous
core meaning of the term (e.g., exhibition of motion picture film in
motion picture theaters) and excludes any uses which lie within the
' Id. at 472. This reading of the case is noted in Engel, Importation and Protection of
Works of American Authors Manufactured Abroad Via the U.C.C. Exemption from For-
malities: How Now Sacred Cow?, 12 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 83, 119-20 & n.126 (1965).
' 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 3.07[A], p. 3-24.
104 Stoll, supra note 14, at 911 n.32, explains that the court in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows,
Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 488 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977), uses the term "second
generation derivative work" to describe a new work using an existing derivative work as
its underlying work and "thus borrowing from the original work."
205 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968).
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unambiguous penumbra (e.g., exhibition of motion picture film on
television)" and another [approach] whereby the "license may prop-
erly pursue any uses which may reasonably be said to fall within the
medium as described in the license."1
It chose the broader approach, because, "if the words are broad enough
to cover the new use, it seems fairer that the burden of framing and
negotiating an exception should fall on the grantor.""°
Of most significance for this analysis was the court's adoption of the
broader view because
it provides a single person who can make the copyrighted work avail-
able to the public over the penumbral medium, whereas the narrower
one involves the risk that a deadlock between the grantor and grantee
might prevent the work's being shown over the new medium at all....
The risk that some May might find the nation's television screens
bereft of the annual display of "Maytime," interlarded with the usual
liberal diet of commercials, is not one a court can take lightly."
This implies that if the original license did not include the right to
authorize a telecast of the movie, then the derivative work proprietor
would be unable to utilize his derivative work in such manner because
to do so would infringe the underlying work's copyright.
Again, however, the court was not faced with prohibiting any use of
the derivative work. For those uses falling within the "unambiguous
core" there was clearly a grant of rights. The fact that the court's opin-
ion was premised on making the derivative work as publicly available as
reasonably possible suggests that it might have experienced difficulty
had the decision required prohibiting any public performances of May-
time.
Another recent case suggesting that no use will be permitted after
termination is Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies. " It involved
a group of British writers and performers who had prepared scripts for
use in a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) television series. Their
agreement prohibited the BBC from making any alterations in the pro-
grams once they were recorded. Subsequently, the BBC, as copyright
proprietors of the derivative television shows, licensed the shows for
broadcast on American television. The agreement executed between the
BBC and the American transferee allowed the American broadcaster to
edit the programs. After the first American broadcast of the edited pro-
grams, the script-writers brought suit to enjoin the American broad-
caster from further broadcasts, claiming that the "mutilation" of the
'" 391 F.2d at 155 (quoting 2 M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 125.3 (1964)).
" 391 F.2d at 155.10 Id.
"1 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). The case has been popularly referred to as the "Monty
Python case."
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programs violated the terms of their agreement with the BBC. The
court of appeals issued a preliminary injunction, agreeing with the
writers that "the recorded program was merely a derivative work taken
from the script in which they hold the uncontested copyright." 110 As a
result, the BBC's use of the recorded programs, even if it owned the
copyrights in them, was "limited by the license granted to BBC by Mon-
ty Python for use of the underlying script."' Furthermore, the court
said:
[A]ny ownership by BBC of the copyright in the recorded programs
would not affect the scope or ownership of the copyright in the under-
lying script.
Since the copyright in the underlying script survives intact despite
the incorporation of that work into a derivative work, one who uses
the script, even with the permission of the proprietor of the deriva-
tive work, may infringe the underlying copyright.'1'2
Again, as in Bartsch, Gilliam did not involve a situation in which
rights had been terminated; rather, it was a case deciding whether
rights for a particular use of the derivative work had ever been granted
-a contract question. The agreement granting the BBC rights to the
scripts limited the uses to which the derivative work could be put. Even
though Bartsch and Gilliam contain language indicating that a deriva-
tive work cannot be used after a grant is terminated, their specific hold-
ings do not reach that far. Furthermore, Gilliam, like Ricordi, concerned
second generation works. Because they were alterations of the BBC pro-
grams, the American broadcaster's versions were a second generation
derivative of the first generation BBC programs, which were them-
selves based on the original scripts. Thus, Gilliam does not necessarily
require that a second generation work not be used after termination.
Another group of cases lends some support to the broad reading of
Ricordi by suggesting a further limitation on utilization of a derivative
work. These cases concern use of a derivative work when its renewal
copyright has not been obtained and it has entered the public domain.
Two recent cases are instructive. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v.
Hastings"' and Russell v. Price' both prohibit certain uses of a deriva-
tive film when the copyright in such film has expired.
In Filmvideo Releasing, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
which would permit him to exhibit seventeen Hopalong Cassidy movies
on television."' The movies, based on seventeen copyrighted books, had
M Id. at 19.
'Il Id
12 Id at 20.
426 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
' 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1980), affg 448 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
I 426 F. Supp. at 692.
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been produced under agreements with the books' author. Renewal copy-
rights in each of the books had been obtained and were still in effect at
the time of suit. Renewal copyrights in the films had not been obtained,
however, and the films were, therefore, in the public domain."' It is not
clear whether or not the proprietor of the films' initial copyright still
held rights to use the underlying work. The plaintiff had obtained nega-
tives of the films but, apparently, had never been a proprietor of any
copyright interest in the derivative work."7 He sought a declaration
that the films were in the public domain and available for his unre-
stricted use regardless of any copyright in the underlying works. The
proprietors of the underlying copyrights in the books counterclaimed
for an injunction to restrain the plaintiff's use of the films. The court
held that the counterclaim stated a cause of action because the underly-
ing copyrights could be infringed by telecast of the public domain
derivative films.
Similarly, Russell v. Price"8 concerned exhibition of a derivative film,
the copyright of which had not been renewed but which was based on
underlying material which was still protected." 9 The defendant in
Russell, a film distributor not licensed by the underlying proprietor,
was renting copies of the film without authorization from the underlying
work proprietor, who sued for copyright infringement. The court found
that "established doctrine prevents unauthorized copying or other in-
fringing use of the underlying work or any part of that work contained
in the derivative product so long as the underlying work itself remains
copyrighted.""10
In both Filmvideo Releasing and Russell the issue was not whether
the underlying copyright proprietor could veto any exhibition of the
derivative work by terminating his grant of rights. Instead, the issue
was whether, because the derivative work had entered the public do-
main, a usurper could claim the right to exhibit the films in competition
with any exhibition licensed by the underlying copyright proprietor. 2'
Furthermore, the issue of competing claims by holders of conflicting
copyrights in the same work was not at issue because the derivative
118 See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 3.07[C].
... He had a possessory interest in the negatives and had obtained them from a foreign
distributor of the films. 426 F. Supp. at 692.
612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1980), affg 448 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
119 The underlying work, George Bernard Shaw's play Pygmalion, copyrighted in 1913,
was renewed in 1941. A motion picture version of the play was produced in 1938 under
license from Shaw but the copyright was allowed to expire in 1966. It is not clear when or if
the original film rights agreement had terminated, but the play proprietors had licensed an
exclusive distributor for the film. Id at 1125.
122 Md at 1128,(footnotes omitted).
121 Indeed, in Russell the underlying proprietor had licensed another to be the exclusive
distributor and the case concerned competing exhibition. Id at 1125.
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copyrights had expired.1" Both Filmvideo and Russell support the view
that when a derivative work enters the public domain while a copyright
still exists in the underlying work, only the new matter contributed to
the derivative work is dedicated to public use."'
The New Property Right Theory
Three cases stand opposed to the theory that derivative works cannot
be used after termination of the underlying transfer. Edmonds v.
Sternm  first advanced what has been called the "new property right"
theory."' In Edmonds, the plaintiff had composed the lyrics and music of
a song which he sold to the defendant. The defendant copyrighted the
song and, with the composer's consent, used it as part of an operetta.
With the composer's further consent, the defendant copyrighted sepa-
rately an orchestral medley of the operetta music. This orchestral
medley contained a version of the melody of the song. Several years
later, the defendant, in settlement of some other litigation with the com-
poser, conveyed back to him the copyright to the song in question. The
defendant continued to sell copies of the orchestral medley, but appar-
ently withdrew from sale the lyrics and music to the song. The com-
poser sued, claiming that the sale of the orchestral arrangement infringed
his copyright in the underlying song. The court disagreed, holding that
there was no infringement because the parties did not intend by their
transfer of the underlying copyright to "lessen or change defendant['s]
enjoyment of the score copyright,"2 and because the transfer back to
the composer "had no effect whatever on the copyright of the operatic
score theretofore taken out."" In discussing the second ground, the
court said that when the composer consented to use of his medley in the
orchestration, "a right of property sprang into existence, not at all af-
fected by the conveyance of any other right."'" It then decided that
in The Russell court recognized this by stating:
[Wihatever place sympathy for the position of creators of derivative works
might properly have .... the defendants here can take advantage of none, hav-
ing contributed nothing to the production of the film "Pygmalion".
Nor is it apparent ... that such sympathy should have any place at all when
the independent copyright on the derivative work has been allowed to expire.
For then there is no longer a conflict between two copyrights, each apparently
granting "their proprietors overlapping 'exclusive' rights to use whatever
underlying material ... had been incorporated into the derivative film."
Id. at 1127-28 (quoting Note, supra note 87, at 912).
1,M Accord, G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
1" 248 F. 897 (2d Cir. 1918).
125 1 M. NIMMER. supra note 8, § 3.07[A], p. 3-23.
1" 248 F. at 898.
127 Id.
in Id.
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defendants were entitled to continue selling the orchestral medley with-
out limitation. There was, therefore, no need to reach the question of
whether defendants were entitled to sell copies of the song printed
before the assignment of the copyright.
Edmonds is precisely on point. The right to use the underlying work
had been lost by the derivative work owner, but the derivative work
had been prepared before the underlying rights were lost. Although the
derivative work necessarily incorporated part of the underlying work,
the court permitted the proprietor of the derivative work to continue to
sell copies of the derivative work.
It is true that the alternate ground could have been sufficient to sup-
port the court's ruling. It appears that what the court meant by there
being an intent "not to lessen or change defendant['s] enjoyment of the
score copyright" is that the author had implicitly granted the defendant
sufficient right to continue selling the orchestral medley. The court
stated: "[T]he transaction by its nature is strong evidence of plaintiffs
continued acquiescence, and approbation in defendant['s] ownership and
enjoyment of the orchestral arrangement."'" Nevertheless, on either
ground, the court was sensitive to the dilemma presented and refused
to enjoin the continued, noninfringing use by the derivative holder.
The second case to support this view is Sunset Securities Co. v.
Coward McCann, Inc.,"8 which involved a 1944 agreement transferring
rights to make a movie from the novel Prelude to Night and limiting
those rights to a term of ten years. The agreement stated that the
rights would revert to seller at the end of the ten years unless the pur-
chaser paid an additional $25,000. The movie rights could be obtained
"in perpetuity" only upon payment of that $25,000.111 In 1948, a film
based on the novel was produced and copyrighted; however, the $25,000
was never paid. The mortgagee of the film filed an action to quiet its
title in the film, but the owner of the underlying work, relying on the
1944 agreement, sought a declaration that it was entitled to ownership
of the film instead. The underlying owner's theory was that, since the
$25,000 was not paid as agreed upon at the end of the ten year period,
the motion picture rights automatically reverted to the owner of the
original work's copyright."2 The court concluded that the purchaser, not
the proprietor of the underlying work, had title to the film and the
129 Id.
13 297 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1956), vacated on other grounds, 47 Cal. 2d 907, 306 P.2d 177 (1957).
The option stated -that the rights would revert to the seller "unless Purchaser shall
elect to pay to Owner on or before the expiration of . . . ten years, an additional sum of
$25,000, in which event Purchaser shall acquire, absolutely and in perpetuity, all rights in
and to the Property herein granted." Id. at 138.
" Id. at 139.
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film's copyright. The decision was based on two grounds: first, the sepa-
rate copyright of the film could not revert to the underlying owner
because it lasted longer than the ten year period; and second, even if the
film rights reverted to the original owner after ten years, the defendant
would not be entitled to possession of the film made pursuant to the
agreement. The court said: "Not only did defendant not sell a film to
American-International but nothing in the agreement suggests that the
parties intended defendant to have any right, title or interest in and to
any film made pursuant to the agreement." 133 Furthermore, the court
stated:
[T]he right to make additional films based on the novel reverts to
defendant at the expiration of ten years. But since defendant origi-
nally conveyed only the right to make, copyright and exploit a film
based on Prelude to Night, the rights in and to the film itself,
together with the copyright to Ruthless and the right to exploit Ruth-
less remains in American-International and its successors without
limitation as to time."u
While the court seems to have confused ownership of the physical prop-
erty, the film, with ownership of rights to exploit it, it is nevertheless
true that the decision illustrates a profound sensitivity to the problem
of prohibiting any further exploitation by the derivative work holder -
especially since the rights were not terminated by operation of law but
by contract.
The first case to articulate a fully reasoned theory for permitting con-
tinued use is the recent and important Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc.135
Rohauer concerned the right to televise the Rudolph Valentino film The
Son of the Sheik."6 Mrs. Edith Hull, author of the novel on which the
film was based and owner of the novel's original term of copyright,
granted movie rights to the predecessors in interest of defendant,
Killiam Shows, Inc.' She granted all movie rights in the novel, together
with the sole and exclusive right to make a movie version of it, the right
to secure copyright on the resulting film and the right to exploit the
film." Mrs. Hull also agreed to renew the novel's copyright and to
assign the renewal to the purchaser. The film was produced, copy-
righted and renewed by Killiam's predecessors. Unfortunately, Mrs.
Hull died before the renewal term of the novel's copyright vested. Copy-
right on her novel was renewed by her daughter and in 1965 her
' Id. at 140.
13 Id. at 140-41.
135 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
,u The film was released for exhibition in 1926. 551 F.2d at 486.
157 Killiam Shows was apparently a movie exhibitor or distributor. See id.
"3 Id.
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daughter assigned all movie and television rights to the plaintiff,
Rohauer. In 1971, the Valentino film was shown on television, a print
having been made available by Killiam. No license for this broadcast
was obtained from Rohauer or Mrs. Hull's daughter. Rohauer claimed
that Killiam no longer had any right to authorize exhibition of its film
because the original term of copyright in the novel, upon which Killiam
based his claim, had expired and Killiam had received no rights under
the renewal term. Killiam, however, claimed that, though no new movie
version could be made, the original grant entitled him and his prede-
cessors to renew the film's copyright and continue exploiting it.
The court ruled in favor of Killiam, even though it conceded that the
author's daughter was entitled to claim the renewal term. It found first
that the "force or validity" clause of section 7 of the 1909 Act 39 did not
apply here. 4' The Rohauer court next distinguished Fitch and Ricordi as
dealing with rights expressly granted only for the first term; the agree-
ments in those cases never purported to grant the renewal term. There-
fore, the court said:
[W]e have been cited to no case holding that the inability of an author
to carry out his promise to effect a renewal of a copyright because of
his death prior to the date for obtaining renewal terminates as a mat-
ter of copyright law the right of a holder of a derivative copyright to
continue to publish a derivative work copyrighted before the author's
death on which the copyrighb was thereafter renewed."'
In resolving the conflict between the derivative copyright granted in
section 7 and renewals granted in section 24, the court relied on policy
considerations, determining that the "equities lie preponderantly in
favor of the proprietor of the derivative copyright." ' It recognized that
46a person who . . . has created an opera or a motion picture film will
often have made contributions literary, musical and economic, as great
as or greater than the original author"'' and that a derivative user has
no effective way to protect himself against the author's death before the
renewal period.'
'" That clause provides: "[Tihe publication of any such new works [ie., derivative works]
shall not affect the force or validity of any part thereof, or be construed to imply an ex-
clusive right to such use of the original works, or to secure or extend copyright in such
original works." 1909 Act, supra note 1, § 7.
14' The court stated that this clause was intended only to protect the proprietor of the
underlying copyright against two specific risks: 1) the risk that a derivative copyright
would be construed to grant exclusive rights to the derivative copyright holder (such were
to be granted only by contract); and 2) the risk that the derivative copyright holder might
let his work fall into the public domain and thereby impair the underlying copyright. 551
F.2d at 489.
141 Id. at 491.
1.. Id, at 493.
143 Id
144 The derivative user cannot tell who will be surviving statutory successors prior to the
author's death.
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This suggests that the court may have been troubled by two other
considerations receiving only implicit recognition. The contributions of
the author of the derivative work are most significant in terms of the
public interest in continuing access to important works -derivative or
original. Certainly, it would be unfortunate for the author of a deriva-
tive work to lose the reward for his work, but the greater loss is the
public's if, in fact, the second author's contributions are "as great or
greater" than the original author's. 5
The Rohauer court's second implicit recognition concerns the fact that
the derivative user is unable to protect himself because of the copyright
law itself. Copyright law makes an author's transfer of renewal rights
potentially ineffective, and thus removes any certainty that the deriva-
tive user's creative effort will be rewarded. Even if the derivative user
tries to buy full protection for himself by purchasing renewal rights
from the author and renewal expectancies from apparent successors, he
may fail because the successors change through operation of the copy-
right law."
Theories for Harmonizing the Decisions
It is possible to reconcile those opinions holding that no right to use
the derivative work survives termination of the underlying copyright
grant with those holding that utilization of the derivative work is per-
mitted. In effecting this reconciliation it is necessary to examine two
distinctions being drawn by the courts; these distinctions are those
drawn between the termination device employed and between the use
of the derivative work that is contemplated. Underlying both distinc-
tions is the attempt to resolve the basic tension between author protec-
tion and public access.
"I The court in Rohauer was careful to distinguish between a transferee who "has done
nothing more than print, publicize and distibute a copyrighted story or novel" and one who
has created a new derivative work. 551 F.2d at 493. Professor Kaplan, speaking of the dual
copyright interest in encouraging creation as well as disseminating ideas, has noted that
"copyright has evidently more to do today with mobilizing the profit-propelled apparatus of
dissemination-publication and distribution-than with calling the signals into first un-
published existence." B. KAPLAN. supra note 43, at 75. As he notes, the serious danger from
certain copyright policies is
the danger of hobbling unduly the reception and enjoyment of the signals by
their potential audience, or of clogging the utilization of the signals by other
authors in the creation of further or improved signals for additional audiences
.... Publication without easy access to the produce would defeat the social
purpose of copyright already mentioned as primary.
Id.
J&6 Under § 24, if the author's spouse or children are not living, then his executors or, in
the absence of a will, his next of kin shall be the statutory successors. 1909 Act, supra note
1, § 24. If a derivative user obtains renewal expectancies from, for example, all known
children, and another is born, the attempt to secure continuing rights may be defeated.
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Courts are sensitive to the device used to terminate rights to exploit
a derivative work. There are three ways in which a derivative user
loses rights to exploit his work under the 1909 Act:
1) by operation of the contract granting him rights to the
underlying work;
2) by his failure to renew the copyright on his derivative
work and its consequential dedication to the public; and
3) by operation of the renewal provisions so as to vest the
renewal copyright in a new proprietor and terminate any
prior grants for the renewal period.
Fitch," ' Ricordi,"8 Bartsch.. and Gilliam" indicate that when rights to
the underlying work are lost by operation of contract, the derivative
work may not be exploited further. Filmvideo Releasing.5 and Russell
v. Price52 indicate that when a derivative proprietor fails to renew copy-
right in his work, a subsisting copyright in the underlying work will
limit use of the derivative work. Rohauer" stands for the proposition
that when rights are lost because copyright law vests the renewal
period in another, then the derivative work may be exploited further-
at least, to an extent. The two cases which do not support this distinc-
tion are Sunset"5 ' and Edmonds,' both of which permitted continued
use of the derivative works even though the rights were terminated by
contract. Edmonds, of course, involved an alternate decisional ground,
so it does not itself defeat this theory. Also, Edmonds did not involve a
grant of rights which terminated the transfer by its own terms. Instead,
the derivative work proprietor, owning the underlying copyright, trans-
ferred it back to the author. Even though the rights were lost by con-
tract, they were not lost by operation of the original contract granting
limited rights to create and exploit a derivative work. They were lost
under a contract transferring the full underlying copyright.
Sunset is more problematical because the opinion is confused. The
case admittedly stands for the proposition that the owner of an underly-
ing copyright does not obtain rights in a derivative work merely
because rights to the underlying work are terminated; but that is not
the issue. It is not clear that the case represents anything beyond the
right to title in the film, since it was a quiet title action.
... 20 F. Supp. at 316; see notes 92-94 & accompanying text supra.
189 F.2d at 471; see notes 95-104 & accompanying text supra.
391 F.2d at 155; see notes 105-08 & accompanying text supra.
11 538 F.2d at 21; see notes 109-12 & accompanying text supra.
II 426 F. Supp at 695; see notes 113-17, 121-23 & accompanying text supra.
612 F.2d at 1128; see notes 118-23 & accompanying text supra.
1 551 F.2d at 494; see notes 135-46 & accompanying text supra.
'u 297 P.2d 137; see notes 130-34 & accompanying text supra.
248 F. 897; see notes 124-29 & accompanying text supra.
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In a sense, termination of the underlying rights through operation of
contract and failing to obtain renewal in the derivative work involve
conscious choice and volition on the part of the derivative proprietor. It
can be assumed that failure to obtain full rights under the contract, as
well as failure to renew, indicate a decision that the derivative work is
or will be of little continuing value. The additional contribution of the
derivative proprietor is likely to be minimal in such case. This is very
different from the situation that arises when the derivative user is sub-
ject to the chance operation of the 1909 Act renewal provisions and has
no way to avoid its operation.
The Rohauer court relies on this distinction' s6 and distinguishes Fitch
and Ricordi on that basis.57 Furthermore, it asserts that the derivative
rights purchaser has no protection under the 1909 Act's renewal provi-
sions and that the provisions "may operate in a peculiarly perverse way
where on the faith of a transfer from the now-deceased author, the
transferee has created a 'derivative work,' say a movie based on the
original novel."" This suggests that it was the copyright law's involve-
ment in terminating the derivative user's rights that concerned the
court.
The distinction is not unprincipled. Copyright policy might dictate
permitting an underlying owner to limit by agreement the uses to which
his work may be put or the time period during which such use may be
had. After all, copyright is still a monopoly favoring the original
author's exploitation of his work. In addition, copyright policy might dic-
tate an underlying proprietor's right to limit usurping uses of a deriva-
tive work which its proprietor failed to renew. On the other hand, copy-
right policy could also dictate permitting use of the derivative work
when the original author did not attempt to limit his transfer and it is
only copyright law that terminates the transfer. The distinction derives
from copyright law's twin objectives of rewarding creative endeavor
while ensuring public access to new ideas. Copyright policy can serve
the reward function by permitting contractual limitations on derivative
work use and by restricting usurpation of public domain derivative
works. Any resulting "deadlock" that deprives the public of access is an
unfortunate, but probably minimal, result of permitting the author's
monopoly. Derivative works prepared under licenses subject to time
and use limitations or dedicated to the public are much less likely to in-
volve the significant extra effort and investment common in other
" The Rohauer court was concerned by this, as is suggested by its emphasis on the fact
that it was "as a matter of copyright law" that the rights to the underlying work were be-
ing terminated. 551 F.2d at 491-92.
' Id. at 490.
," B. KAPLAN, supra note 43, at 112.
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derivative works. However, when the copyright act itself, through its
"peculiarly perverse" renewal provisions, operates to frustrate the pub-
lic interest, copyright policy must reach a different result.'59
No court has actually prohibited all further exploitation of an impor-
tant derivative work. Although Ricordi and Fitch suggested that pro-
hibiting the use of the derivative work should follow, neither case reached
that result in its holding. Filmvideo Releasing and Russell permitted
utilization by the underlying proprietor. Rohauer, the first case con-
fronting the issue, permitted continued use.' Gilliam did not prohibit
use of the derivative work itself; rather, that court would have permit-
ted the American broadcaster to show the Monty Python series as origi-
nally recorded. What was prohibited was creating a second generation,
"mutilated" version of the BBC programs. Thus, it seems that courts
have been sensitive to the public access policy.
The second distinction drawn in these cases concerns the use to which
the derivative work is put. They appear to distinguish, first, between
copies and new derivative works. The two cases'' dealing with second
generation uses denied such use to the derivative copyright holder. On
the other hand, in all cases which dealt with a first generation use, some
continued use was permitted. Ricordi concerned authorization to make a
movie version of the opera; such use was held unauthorized absent a
continuing grant from the underlying copyright holder. Gilliam enjoined
performance of the "mutilated" version of the recorded Monty Python
programs, while indicating that continued showing of the unaltered sec-
ond generation programs was not prohibited. 6 ' In contrast, the un-
changed second generation works in Fitch, Bartsch, Edmonds and Sun-
set were allowed to be used as originally contemplated.' Even though
1"9 It is particularly perverse because it operates even in the face of an author's expressed
willingness to grant the renewal term. It could be argued that the Supreme Court has man-
dated the "peculiarly perverse" result by its holding in Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N.
Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960). There, the Court held that a purported grant of renewal
rights may be invalid because it is only an expectancy. The Court said: "A purchaser of
such an interest is deprived of nothing. Like all purchasers of contingent interests, he takes
subject to the possibility that the contingency may not occur:' Id. at 378.
In reply, it can be argued that even if the Court mandated that the derivative user must
take the risk that he may not be able to retain the full underlying bundle of granted rights
(including rights to create new works as well as exploit previously prepared ones), the
Court's holding does not require that the derivative user assume the risk that all uses of a
completed work may be lost.
16 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
m Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); G. Ricordi
& Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).I" Of course, such usage of the recorded programs was clearly not a violation of the
scriptwriters' agreement with the BBC, so this does not mean that continued showing of
the second generation work would necessarily be permitted, absent a grant from the
screenwriters.
16 The same may also be true in Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1980), and
Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 426 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
[Vol. 56:1
DERIVATIVE WORKS
Rohauer sanctioned some alteration in The Son of the Sheik, it only
allowed the addition of a few subtitles and some new music.1" The court
considered this insufficient to make it a new work.165 The decision can be
interpreted to mean that, even with those small changes, the use per-
mitted was only a copying. Of course, the line between a copy and a new
derivative work is a fine one, but the distinction nevertheless appears
to have influenced the courts.
An additional use distinction deals with the medium in which the
derivative work is to be exploited. The derivative works in Rohauer and
Bartsch, though used without alteration, were used in a new medium,
television, which, even if within the possible contemplation of the
author when the underlying grant was made, was certainly not the main
use which was contemplated -exhibition in motion picture theatres.
The Rohauer court managed to bootstrap permissible use of the movie
in a new medium into an argument for labeling the videotape version a
copy and not a new derivative work. While agreeing that no new third
generation version could be permitted, it held that there was no in-
fringement in creating a videotape copy of the movie for television
transmission. 6' The court found that such copy was "necessary for
television transmission"'6 7 and, hence, not a new version of the film.
Despite this, it appears that cases permitting continued use of the
derivative work do not intend that a portion of the underlying owner's
copyright -be thereby dedicated to the derivative work owner. It ap-
pears that they do intend either to define certain uses by the derivative
work owner as noninfringing or to create a defense to a claim of in-
fringement for certain uses. Derivative proprietors have not been allowed
to exploit their derivative works by creating new derivative works,
even though the original grant of rights permitted such further crea-
tion. This indicates that the rights under copyright originally granted to
the derivative user are not being dedicated to him. Instead, the courts
seem to be establishing a doctrine similar to the fair use doctrine under
which acts which would ordinarily constitute infringement may be im-
mune from liability even though the fair user has no claim to ownership
of rights under the copyright.'
I" The addition of new music may have been outside the purview of the underlying
copyright anyway.
' 551 F.2d at 494 n.12.
lId at 494.
"v IaL
"! Under the 1909 Act, courts have long recognized that certain acts of copying are
defensible under a judicial fair use defense. 3 M. NImMER, supra note 8, § 13.05; see, e.g.,
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973). Nimmer has argued
that "fair use is a defense not because of the absence of substantial similarity but rather
despite the fact that the similarity is substantial." M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 13.05, p.
13-50. The fair use doctrine is now expressly recognized in the 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 107.
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1976 Act: Derivative Works Exception
If, in fact, these distinctions have influenced court decisions, it is
necessary to consider them in light of the new derivative works excep-
tions in sections 203(b)(1) and 304(c)(6)(A) of the 1976 Act, because the
distinctions drawn in three cases closely parallel the statutory distinc-
tions."6 9 Courts dealing with the 1909 Act seem to have reached the
same solution Congress did in enacting the termination of transfer pro-
visions and the derivative works exceptions. This suggests that, to the
extent the 1909 Act must be relied on in the future, it is proper to con-
tinue the judicial derivative works exception, because it recognizes an
increasingly troublesome practical problem never contemplated by the
framers of the 1909 Act. Section 203(b)(1) and section 304(c)(6)(A) state:
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its
termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant
after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the
preparation after the termination of other derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.'
That this exception enacts the same distinctions made in cases under
the 1909 Act is apparent from a comparison of those distinctions with
the statutory exception.
First, the derivative works exception continues to distinguish be-
tween terminations brought about by operation of law and those result-
ing from their own terms or by failure to renew the derivative work.
Transfers limited in time by their own terms are permitted under the
1976 Act 7' and the House Report states: "If, for example, an agreement
provides an earlier termination date or lesser duration, or if it allows
the author the right of cancelling or terminating the agreement under
certain circumstances, the duration is governed by the agreement."'7
The derivative works exception is codified in sections 203 and 304,
which deal with statutory terminations of transfers, not with contrac-
tual limitations. Since no derivative works exception is included for con-
... The Rohauer court, in fact, partially based its decision on the policy considerations
embodied in the derivative works exception, finding in § 203(b)(1) "evidence of a belief on
the part of Congress of the need for special protection for derivative works." 551 F.2d at
494.
170 1976 Act, supra note 3, §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A). The grant referred to is an "exclusive
or non-exclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or any right under copyright."
Id- § 203(a). The § 203 exception applies only to inter vivos transfers or licenses executed by
the author, and not his successors. H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 125. The § 304 exception ap-
plies to transfers and licenses executed by the author or renewal beneficiaries under the
1909 Act. Id at 140.
... The "transfer of copyright ownership" provision contained in § 101 applies "whether
or not it [the transfer] is limited in time or place of effect." 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 101.
" H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 128. A virtually identical statement is made regarding §
304. Id at 142.
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tractual terminations, it can be inferred that none was intended. As the
House Report states: "Nothing contained in this section [2031 or else-
where in this legislation is intended to extend the duration of any
license, transfer or assignment made for a period of less than thirty-five
years."17
The 1976 Act intends to permit no further use of a derivative work
after a contractual loss of rights to the underlying work. Under the 1976
Act the problem of failing to obtain renewal of the derivative copyright
will not arise because the renewal system is eliminated in favor of a uni-
tary term."" The 1976 Act does expressly permit continued "utilization"
of a derivative work if rights to the underlying work are lost through
operation of the termination of transfer provisions in the copyright law.
This is consistent with the distinction explicitly drawn in Rohauer and
implicit in the other cases dealing with the issue under the 1909 Act.
The enactment of a derivative works exception with respect to ter-
minations occurring by operation of law suggests that Congress was
sensitive to the deadlock problem recognized by the courts.' The ex-
tent of this sensitivity can be measured by the scope of the derivative
works exception. The 1976 Act neither tries "to effect any fine balance
according to the importance of the derivative work or the degree to
which it is based upon the earlier work,"'76 nor attempts to describe the
scope of "utilization" permitted under the derivative works exception.
Congress did not limit the derivative works exception to important
works or to marginally derivative works. This implies that Congress felt
it more important to make derivative works available, regardless of
their importance, than to restrict the exception.
"7 Id.
1 See notes 48-49 & accompanying text supra.
175 Nolan states that "the right of termination was fought tooth and nail by the motion
picture industry." Nolan, supra note 14, at 32. Furthermore, "to obtain industry support for
at least some form of termination right, some concessions had to be made." Id. One of those
concessions was the derivative works exception. This suggests that Congress had been
made sensitive to the deadlock problem and intended some relief by enacting the derivative
works exception. Curtis has characterized the derivative works exception as embodying a
sensitivity to the problem, by stating:
The Code [1976 Act] thus recognizes that a "derivative work" frequently in-
volves significant authorship by the derivative user and that it may be unfair
to prohibit all further use of such work after termination or to subject its
creator to the possibly exorbitant demands of the owner of an underlying
work. Indeed, the derivative work thus lost to the public might be far more
important than the underlying work (for example, an opera using the storyline
of a long-forgotten novel).
Curtis, supra note 14, at 55.
Despite statutory language that derivative copyrights cover only new material, the 1976
Act exempts utilization of derivative works, including material from the underlying work.
See Note, supra note 26, at 648. Compare 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 103(b) and id. § 203(b)(1)
with id. § 304(c)(6)(A).
"l6 Curtis, supra note 14, at 55.
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The policy of making derivative works accessible will depend on the
meaning given to the phrase "may continue to be utilized."' ' Congress
explicitly recognized distinctions in the various uses to which a deriva-
tive work may be put in the statutory exception, which states: "[T]his
privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of
other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the
terminated grant."'78 The 1976 Act, then, distinguishes "utilization" and
"preparation of other derivative works." This parallels the distinction
between first and second generation works drawn by cases under the
1909 Act. The House Report offers little guidance to the scope of this
distinction, but does state that "a film made from a play could continue
to be licensed for performance after the motion picture contract had
been terminated but any remake rights covered by the contract would
be cut off."' 79
It apparently makes no difference that the permitted utilization may,
after termination, directly compete with any new derivative use author-
ized by the terminating author.8 ' Curtis argues that this distinction pro-
hibits preparation of new derivative works after termination "even
though such new works may use nothing more of the author's work than
the grantee's original derivative work." ' The cases under the 1909 Act
do not seem to make this distinction either.
Since the derivative works exception in the 1976 Act embodies dis-
tinctions which courts interpreting the 1909 Act were also making, it is
logical to refer to those decisions in interpreting the 1976 Act.82 It
should be noted that in one context the solutions reached under the
1909 Act will still be law. Copyrights in their first term on January 1,
1978 will still be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright
under section 304(a).183 Since the House Report said that section 304(a)
"reenacts and preserves the renewal provision ... in section 24 of the
statute, for all .. .works presently in their first 28-year term,"'' it
". 1976 Act, supra note 3, §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A).
178 Id.
179 H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 127.
18 Curtis, supra note 14, at 56.
Id. at 57.
8 As the Rohauer court acknowledged in relying on the 1976 Act's policies and ac-
comodations, the provisions of one act "cannot be read as varying clear provisions" of the
other act in cases to which the former act does not apply. 551 F.2d at 494. But, where the
two acts are not explicitly inconsistent, solutions reached and reasoning applied under one
act may be particularly useful in interpreting the other.
18 This renewal and extension will, however, be for a term longer than the 28 year
renewal provided under the 1909 Act. 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 304(a). As a result, such
works may be subject to renewal terminations under § 304(a) as well as terminations of the
extended renewal terms under § 304(c).
'" H.R. REP.. supra note 16, at 134.
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seems that prior decisions interpreting the 1909 Act renewal provisions
will be binding.18
Professor Nimmer argues that the 1976 Act fails to expressly provide
for a continued utilization right in the renewal context and that this sug-
gests that such was not intended under the current 1909 Act.'' Aside
from the usual difficulties of reading any meaning into silence, there is
the added problem that Congress could hardly have been concerned
with altering the old law when it was rectifying apparent errors in a
new law. Furthermore, Congress may have been relying on a perceived
judicial works exception under the 1909 Act.
ACTIVITIES CONSTITUTING NONINFRINGING "UTILIZATION"
Determining whether a movie producer will be permitted to exploit
his derivative work in a particular way after termination of the author's
transfer to him requires answering three questions: first, does the use
involve a right under copyright?; second, does the use constitute
preparation of a new derivative work?; and third, does the contemplated
use constitute continued "utilization" of the derivative work?
The first requirement, that the right at issue be a right under copy-
right, is not a requirement of the derivative works exception itself, but
of the termination of transfer provisions. Section 203(b)(5) and section
304(c)(6)(E) state that "termination of a grant under this section affects
only those rights covered by the grants that arise under this title." Sec-
tion 203(b) says that all rights "under this title" and covered by the ter-
minated grants will revert; section 203(a) indicates that the exclusive or
nonexclusive grant of "any right under a copyright" is subject to termi-
nation. Section 304(c) provides that the renewal copyright or "any right
under it" are terminable. There is some ambiguity as to whether the
phrases "under this section," "under this title" and "under a copyright"
connote anything different from the phrase "right comprised in a copy-
right" used elsewhere in the new Act,"8 7 but this discussion assumes
that if a particular right has been considered a contract right rather
than a copyright under prior law and that no change is indicated in the
1976 Act, then it will be nonterminable.
If the right granted is a right under copyright, then two questions
must be considered. The first question is whether the contemplated use
"I The only change in the § 304 renewal provisions tracking § 24 of the 1909 Act concerns
the definition of a "posthumous work." Id. at 139. Therefore, decisions concerning the effect
of § 24 on the use of a derivative work created under a grant which purported to include
renewal rights as well should remain law.
IM 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 3.07[A], p. 3-31.
"s See 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 201(b) (works made for hire); id § 101 (definitions).
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of the derivative work constitutes preparation of a new derivative work
based on the underlying work. This requirement is found in the second
clause of the derivative works exception, which states that the right to
utilize after termination "does not extend to the preparation after ter-
mination of other derivative works." '88 Of course, if a new work is pre-
pared based on the derivative work but using no part of the underlying
work, it would be permitted since it would not be derived from the
original work.
Second, it is not clear whether "utilization" and "preparation of
another derivative work" are meant to be mutually exclusive categories
but, as the law is written, both questions must be answered correctly to
continue the use. If the use involves creation of a new derivative work
or if the use is not deemed a "utilization," it will be prohibited. As noted
above,188 the Rohauer court bootstrapped a use deemed not to create a
new derivative work into a permissible "utilization." Such an argument
is also possible under the 1976 Act.
Following is a discussion of various important rights typically ac-
quired by a movie producer for production of a derivative work movie.' 90
The rights are examined to determine if specific uses deriving there-
under will be permitted regardless of termination. This discussion
assumes that the rights have been clearly granted to the producer; am-
biguous grants are not implicated. The question is whether termination
alone will prohibit further use.
Production Rights
Synchronization Rights
A movie producer who wishes to use music on a soundtrack must ac-
quire two rights in the music: first, the right to perform publicly the
music recorded on the soundtrack (a performing right); and second, the
right to record the music onto the soundtrack in synchronization or
timed relation to the visual aspect of the movie (a synchronization
right). The synchronization right was not referred to in the 1909 Act
and its statutory source is not clear. 9 ' However, two courts have inter-
preted section 1(e) of the 1909 Act as granting the copyright owner of a
"' Id. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A).
" See text accompanying note 166 supra.
A typical agreement granting motion picture rights in a literary work is set out in J.
TAUBMAN, supra note 23, at 9-37. A typical agreement is summarized and discussed in Stein,
supra note 14, at 1160. Typical synchronization and performance licenses are set out in J.
TAUBMAN. supra note 23, at 321-24.
"' See Nolan, supra note 14, at 22-23.
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song the exclusive right to record his music on a soundtrack.19 The syn-
chronization right also falls within the 1976 Act's exclusive right to
reproduce provision contained in section 106(1)."'1 Since the synchroniza-
tion right is a right under copyright, it is terminable.
The effect of termination is not obvious, because it is not clear
whether the synchronization right is implicated every time a print of
the movie is made, or only once, at the outset, when the master sound-
track is first constructed. If the synchronization right is required only to
lay down the master soundtrack, then the synchronization license from
the music owner is a one time license and termination of the license will
be irrelevant to continued use of the movie."' If synchronization is a one
time right, prints of the movie soundtrack produced after termination of
the synchronization license cannot infringe the copyright in the syn-
chronized music because manufacture of these copies does not require
resynchronization of the music. 9 '
If, on the other hand, the right to synchronize is implicated every
time any print of the soundtrack is made then the synchronization
license is a continuing license and termination of the grant could require
that no further prints of any kind be made of the soundtrack.9 ' That is,
19 Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1952); Famous
Music Corp. v. Metz, 28 F. Supp. 767, 769 (W.D. La. 1939).
"I This provision grants a copyright owner the exclusive right to "reproduce the copy-
righted work in copies or phonorecords." 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 106(1).
"' This would be a problem only if the master soundtrack had not been recorded before
termination was effective, that is, if the licensee had never exercised his one time use. Of
course, in such case, no derivative work (soundtrack) will have been created either.
"I There is no case law on these issues. It seems to follow automatically that if the syn-
chronization right is required only to lay down the master soundtrack then prints of the
track onto film do not constitute a resynchronization. It is not clear, though, that making
copies in other media, such as videotapes of a film, should also not require an additional syn-
chronization license. Rohauer may be dispositive of the question. The Rohauer court ex-
pressly held that a videotape of a movie for television transmission was not a new version
of the original film and, hence, copying the film onto videotape did not constitute an in-
fringement. 551 F.2d at 494-95 & n.12. This implies that copying a film's soundtrack onto a
videotape does not infringe the synchronization right of the underlying music's owner.
Since the film involved in Rohauer was a silent film, though, it is not clear that the opinion
can be read to involve soundtrack synchronization rights. Motion picture studios apparently
assume that synchronization is a one time right and operate accordingly.
'" The question involved here is not merely academic. Scores are specially composed for
many films by a composer employed by the producer. In such case, the resulting music is a
work for hire and all rights under copyright in the music vest in the producer under §§ 24
and 26 of the 1909 Act, supra note 1, and § 201(a) of the 1976 Act, supra note 3. No syn-
chronization license problems arise with respect to such works because the rights are not
terminable.
However, incidental music is unlikely to be specially composed for the movie. Instead,
synchronization and performance rights in the music will be obtained from the proprietor of
the specific song desired. Furthermore, some movie soundtracks are made of a series of
popular songs each of which requires separate synchronization and performance licenses.
For such soundtracks, termination could be a serious problem which might necessitate
limiting exploitation of the movie, paying additional expensive royalties or bearing the risk
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it can be argued that each time a print of the film and soundtrack are
made, the music is resynchronized onto the film and, hence, a continuing
license for such copying is required. Under this theory, termination
could have a serious impact, so that the derivative works exception
must be examined.
If copying a film's master soundtrack onto new prints constitutes
preparation of a new derivative work, then termination of the synchron-
ization right would require that only copies of the soundtrack prepared
prior to termination be used thereafter; copies prepared after termina-
tion would infringe the music copyright owner's right of reproduction.
Alternatively, one could argue that so long as the master soundtrack re-
mains unaltered, prints thereof are not new derivative works; they are
only copies of the existing derivative work. Under this theory, even if
the synchronization license were terminated, further prints of the
soundtrack might be permitted as a continued utilization of the basic
derivative work.
The second view is preferable since unaltered copies of the master
soundtrack are not further derivative works, but are necessary to con-
tinue performance utilization through theatrical exhibition. Because con-
tinued performance utilization of movies is clearly intended by the
authors of the 1976 Act,'97 making the copies necessary for such exhibi-
tion should not constitute creation of a new derivative work in violation
of the derivative works exception.'98
Script Rights
The right to record the script is, as are music synchronization rights,
of copyright infringement through warranties to subsequent users.
The problem is complicated by the fact that, even with respect to soundtracks scored as
works for hire, movie producers may have assigned their whole copyright in the music to a
music publisher (often a subsidiary corporation of the producing organization) reserving
only synchronization rights necessary to exhibit their films. Even though in such cases the
synchronization right will not be terminable because the termination provisions do not ap-
ply to works made for hire, rights for particular uses of the synchronized music may not be
reserved by the producer. For example, the producer may have failed to reserve syn-
chronization rights sufficiently broad to cover use of the music on videotape. In such cases,
then, the scope of the termination or the derivative works exception will be complicated by
issues of the scope of the original synchronization license.
12 See H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 127.
Nimmer apparently agreed with this conclusion. He states that since a motion picture
cannot realistically be utilized unless the producer "has a continuing right to make new
prints" of the film, then "producing new prints and even new negatives (if not reedited)
should be treated as making new copies of a work in order to 'utilize' it rather than as
creating new derivative works." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 11.02[B], p. 11-15. There
seems to be no reason to distinguish between the rights to copy the film itself (with sound-
track) and the right to copy the music synchronized on the soundtrack.
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a right of reproduction."' Virtually all film scripts are either works for
hire or commissioned works and, therefore, exempt from termination."0
For those outside the works for hire doctrine, the analysis is similar to
that under synchronization rights.
Character and Sequel Rights
Typically, a motion picture rights agreement for use of a copyrighted
literary work will include a grant of rights to use the characters repre-
sented in the literary work and to make sequel versions of the underly-
ing story."1 These rights are interrelated, since sequel rights are
generally thought to be in the nature of character rights."2 It is with
respect to such grants that the most interesting problems involving the
derivative works exception are likely to arise. The first problem is that
it is not at all clear that characters are copyrightable. °3 Second, it is in
this area that draftsmen are likely to make the greatest efforts to pro-
tect the underlying work owner from losing very valuable rights
through operation of the derivative works exception.
Since courts disagree about whether characters are copyrightable,
such rights may not be terminable under sections 203 and 304 because
they are not rights under copyright. Grants of those rights may be sub-
ject to the contract terms of the grant only. If character and sequel
rights are not rights under copyright, they will be terminable only if so
stated in -the rights agreement. If such rights are rights under copy-
right, the termination provisions will apply and the questions of cre-
ating a new derivative work and continued utilization arise.0 4
I" It must be noted that Congress did not intend that use of previously prepared works
in a derivative work would thereby convert the derivative work into a joint work and make
the authors of the underlying works coauthors of the movie. The House Report states: "In
this case, the motion picture is a derivative work ... and section 103 makes plain that copy-
right in a derivative work is independent of, and does not enlarge the scope of rights in, any
pre-existing material incorporated in it." H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 120.
See 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 101.
1 See J. TAUBMAN, supra note 23, at 10; Stein, supra note 14, at 1160.
Sequel rights allow the reuse of a story's characters in otherwise new stories and
situations. Nimmer, for example, states that it is the very question of using copyrighted
characters in sequels that makes it appropriate "to consider the copyrightability of a
character apart from the original work in which the character appeared." 1 M. NIMMER.
supra note 8, § 2.12, p. 2-167.
m Compare, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) with
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954)
(the "Sam Spade case"). See also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 2.12.
1 This suggests that differences of interpretation among jurisdictions will affect rights
agreements and the resulting permissible utilization of derivative works. The same con-
tract language may have vastly different consequences for the derivative user in different
jurisdictions.
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Because of the confusion, agreements granting such rights usually
spell out in detail the precise limits on the grant to ensure that, contrac-
tually, the parties are protected. It has been suggested that careful
drafting of the rights agreement necessitates inserting a broad rever-
sionary clause "conditioning the vitality of all granted rights other than
those arising under the Copyright Act upon the continued ownership of
the rights arising under copyright in the purchaser."" 5 That is, to avoid
the consequences of a judicial decision that sequel and character rights
are nonterminable because they are contract rights only, owners of
underlying works will insist on contract provisions to recapture non-
copyright rights as well.0 6 As noted above, such a clause is permitted
under the 1976 Act.0 7
To avoid conflicts with the derivative works exception permitting
continued utilization, Stein suggests that a further contract provision
clearly specifying that recapture of the noncopyright rights will take
place "notwithstanding the retention by the purchaser of certain deriva-
tive work rights under section 203(b)(1)" is necessary to protect the
underlying owner.0 8 This provision is designed to permit continued
"utilization" of the derivative work but recapture all other motion pic-
ture rights regardless of their source. It would not, therefore, seem to
conflict with the congressional purposes behind sections 203 and 304,
since the provision intends the statutory allocation of interests in a con-
tract context.
In at least one context, though, a conflict may arise, that is, with
respect to continuing derivative uses. If an author grants all motion pic-
ture and television rights in his best-selling novel to a producer and the
agreement contains both a broad reversionary clause and a derivative
work exception clause and if the producer makes a hit movie, it is likely
that the producer may subsequently produce or license a television
series based on his movie. The television show will be both a sequel and
a derivative work involving characters from the movie and the novel in
completely new stories. If we assume that termination is effected, but
that the television series is produced and broadcast for the first time
during the two years before the effective date of termination, then a
problem arises concerning the ability to continue producing and broad-
casting the series after termination. If the show-has a predicted life of
seven years, could the entire series be considered a continuing deriva-
tive work and, therefore, throughout its life be exempt from termina-
tion and utilizable? Or, would all production after the first two years be
Stein, supra note 14, at 1163.
The contract provision would become operative if a termination of the other rights is
effected.
See text accompanying notes 171-72 supra.
Stein, supra note 14, at 1164.
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a breach of contract and infringement of the recaptured copyrights
because new derivative works are being prepared? The problem arises
as both a copyright and a contract question. If character and sequel
rights are copyrights and are, therefore, terminable, it is a problem of
statutory interpretation; if such rights are purely contractual, it is still
a problem of interpretation of the derivative works exception because
under this agreement both copyright and contract rights are recaptured
after statutory termination.
A conflict arises between the statute's cutting off rights to make new
derivative works while permitting "utilization" of works prepared
under the grant. Resolution of the conflict will have both statutory and
contractual implications; it is not at all clear what the answer should be.
The choice is whether to leave all rights to continue producing and
broadcasting the series with the producer, or to return all such rights to
the termination proprietor for relicense. The practical choice seems to
be whether to permit the underlying work proprietor or the derivative
work proprietor to profit from the increased value accruing from the
series and resulting probably from both the hit movie and the television
series. If a deadlock were to result, it seems likely courts would leave
the rights with the producer as the entity most likely to further the
public interest in access to the series. The question is complicated by
the fact that the mere use of character or sequel rights deriving from
the underlying novel weakens the author's claim-his contribution to
the series is minimal in comparison to the producer's. Also, the fact that
the ultimate claim may be a contract claim rather than a copyright claim
may be determinative. If production and broadcast of the television
series implicates only the sequel or character rights, all other rights be-
ing recaptured, only a contractual claim will prevent broadcast and pro-
duction in the future.
Titles
Under the dominant theory, titles are not copyrightable. 9 They are
not, therefore, terminable and underlying work proprietors must at-
tempt to protect their titles by contract or by other legal theories. 1°
The problems discussed above with respect to a continuing derivative
work.1 . may arise if proprietors attempt to protect titles through con-
tract language, conditioning retention on nontermination. Such prob-
lems are less intrusive for titles, because the public interest in access to
works under a particular title is weak.
' See cases cited in 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 8, § 2.16.
1' For example, titles may be protected under the theory of unfair competition.
m" See text following notes 208-09 supra.
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Remakes and Other Adaptations
The rights to create a movie version usually include not only the right
to make a movie adaptation of the basic work, but also rights to produce
a script for preparation of the final movie form, to produce foreign
language movie versions and to produce other movie versions, such as a
movie musical or remakes. 12 These rights are in addition to perform-
ance rights and authorize the movie producer to prepare and record the
movie which he will later exhibit.
Such rights are clearly rights under copyright. They are subsumed
under two separate copyright theories since they involve rights to copy
or reproduce the underlying work as well as the right to make other
versions. An exclusive right to copy is granted in section 1(a) of the 1909
Act; this protects against movie versions copied from the underlying
work even though the copy exists in a different medium."3 Section 1(b)
of the 1909 Act grants the exclusive right to make dramatizations of a
nondramatic work or other versions of a copyrighted literary work. The
Supreme Court held that a movie version of a novel constitutes a
dramatization of the novel and, if unauthorized, an infringement of the
right of dramatization held by the copyright proprietor of the novel.'
Hence, under the 1909 Act a grant of movie rights with respect to
almost any work will implicate both the right to copy and the right to
make other versions.
The 1976 Act continues this pattern. Section 106(1) recognizes an ex-
clusive right to reproduce the underlying copyrighted work in copies." '
"Copies" are defined in section 101 as "material objects ... in which a
work is fixed ... and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device."2 6 This definition encompasses movie versions. Furthermore,
under the 1976 Act the right to prepare derivative works is an exclusive
right granted to the owner of the copyright. 17 The section 101 definition
of "derivative work" includes motion picture versions. Therefore, as in
the 1909 Act, motion picture rights almost always involve both the right
of reproduction and the right to prepare derivative works." 8
,21 One example would be updated movie versions made subsequent to a first movie ver-
sion but presenting the same story.
212 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
21 Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
212 1976 Act, supra note 3, § 106(1).
26 Id. § 101.
" Id. § 106(2).
218 The House Report explicitly recognizes this by pointing out that the right to prepare
derivative works
overlaps the exclusive right of reproduction to some extent. It is broader than
that right, however, in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies
[Vol. 56:1
DERIVATIVE WORKS
Under both Acts, basic motion picture rights are rights under copy-
right and, hence, terminable under sections 203 and 304. The effect of
termination should not depend on which theory is used since, practically
speaking, whenever the right to copy is infringed, the right to prepare a
derivative work will also be infringed."9
The House Report indicates that after termination, even though a
film could still be licensed for performance, "any remake rights covered
by the contract would be cut off."" ° There seems little room for argu-
ment that such use should be permitted; exercise of the remake right is,
by definition, both the creation of a new derivative work and an imper-
missible utilization under sections 203(b)(1) and 304(c)(6)(A). It is also dif-
ficult to argue that re-editing should be permitted after termination; re-
editing is so close to producing a remake that it should be considered a
creation of a new derivative work.
Using film clips from an already prepared movie in a new movie or
television production, or in new theatrical or television "trailers'" is
not so clearly impermissible. It can be argued that advertising is neces-
sary to effectively release the film for further theatrical or television
exhibition, and, therefore, to "utilize" the film. However, this argument
may be countered by noting that trailers prepared before termination
may still be used for advertising. Alternatively, trailers using no clips
from the film could be produced. Using clips in a new movie or televi-
sion show is even less likely to be permissible, since it is not possible to
argue that this use is necessary for effective utilization.
Dubbing in a foreign language soundtrack or superimposing foreign
language subtitles on the already prepared movie after termination
goes one step further. This could be considered a use necessary for utili-
zation in foreign countries and, hence, not a new derivative work. On
the other hand, writing and recording a translation of the fixed movie
are separate creative acts which may result in the creation of a new
derivative work.' Since both the 1909 and 1976 Acts consider transla-
or phonorecords, whereas the preparation of a derivative work, such as a
ballet, pantomine, or improvised performance, may be an infringement even
though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.
H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 62.
It seems logical that remakes and musical versions be considered the equivalent of basic
motion picture rights because they are merely more specific repetitions of those rights (at a
later time or by the addition of music). Foreign language versions need not be analyzed dif-
ferently from basic movie rights. This is because under the 1909 Act, they should constitute
either a dramatization, another workor a translation (all rights under § 1(b)) and under the
1976 Act, they fall within the definition of a derivative work in § 101.
2,9 See 2 M. NIMMER. supra note 8, § 9.07.
22 H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 127.
An example would be short "coming attraction" advertisements.
The problem is probably academic because derivative work owners will have the en-
tire period (at least two and up to ten years) after notice of termination, but before termina-
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tion to be an act resulting in new derivative works,' it seems likely
that dubbing or superimposing titles will also be deemed creation of a
new derivative work. It would require a unique fact situation to justify
any argument that a new foreign language version is necessary for
utilization.
The right to utilize the remake right is most forcefully presented with
respect to making new prints from the original negative. This could be
considered creation of new derivative work, but the better view is that
the new prints, if unaltered, are merely copies necessary for utilization. 4
Performance Rights
Performance rights are most clearly within the derivative works ex-
ception. Such rights are rights under copyright; section 106(4) states
that the right to perform a literary, musical or dramatic motion picture
or other audio-visual work is an exclusive right under copyright.' 5 Per-
formance of the recorded film does not, by itself, create a new deriva-
tive work."' Congress intended that continued utilization by theatrical
exhibition be permitted under the derivative works exception.'
Problems will most likely arise with respect to performances in new
media or media not specifically provided for in the grant of performance
rights. The issues raised by such performances are not whether they
constitute "utilization" or the preparation of a new derivative work, but
rather, whether the original contractual terms included such use. If the
contemplated use was never granted to the derivative user, then it may
not be exercised after termination-not because it is outside the scope
of continued utilization, but because it was never the derivative work
owner's to exercise in the first place. 8 It is unlikely that agreements
tion is effective, in which to prepare foreign language versions for exhibition after termina-
tion. 1976 Act, supra note 3, §§ 203(a)(4}(A), 304(c)(4)(A).
Section I(b) of the 1909 Act, supra note 1, lists the right to translate a copyrighted
literary work into other languages as an exclusive right under copyright. Section 101 of the
1976 Act, supra note 3, includes "a translation" within the definition of "derivative work."
' See 3 M. NIMMER. supra note 8, § 11.02[B].
1976 Act, supra note 3, § 106(4).
Certainly, if the film is re-edited or altered in some other way, a new derivative work,
falling outside the derivative works exception, may have been created; but, such alteration
would infringe a production right, not a performance right. It is hard to imagine how per-
formance of a film could constitute a "preparation." Perhaps some form of conceptual art
embodying performance of an existing film along with dance or song might be a perform-
ance of the film which contributed to the preparation of a new derivative work.
H.R. REP.. supra note 16, at 127.
The derivative works exception is implicated because the derivative work may only be
utilized "inder the terms of the grant" after termination. 1976 Act, supra note 3, §§
203(b)(1), 304(c)(6}(A); cf. Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968) (analogous case arising under the 1909 Act). But, the question
raised does not require parsing the derivative works exception. If the contemplated use in
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will change significantly with respect to the scope of media licensed as a
result of the derivative works exceptions. Provisions covering licensed
media were revised after the advent of television so that rights in
unknown media are now clearly spelled out.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, this exception to the rights of underlying owners will re-
quire further judicial elaboration and practical drafting experience
before its ramifications are clear. The problems discussed are immedi-
ate and important." In changing the 1909 Act's renewal system, Con-
gress recognized that the "tremendous growth in communications media
has substantially lengthened the commercial life of a great many
works."' 0 The growth of the communications industry has also changed
the nature of copyright. Artistic works are no longer merely published,
they are merchandised; they are subdivided into component parts and
derivative rights, and are exploited on that basis. As the brief analysis
of permitted uses demonstrates, derivative works today are derived
from a host of copyright and contractual rights of great complexity.
Congress recognized the pressing need for some protection, both for
the public and the derivative user, of works spun off a basic work. The
need is especially pressing in view of the 1976 Act's increased term of
copyright. The period during which a derivative work may be dead-
locked now covers more than two generations. The change was neces-
sary because the 1909 Act was increasingly unable to cope with the
problem.
The accommodation reached by the Rohauer court, which closely
parallels the statutory provisions, is necessary and desirable. The ac-
commodation may sully the pristine purity of copyright theory, but it
definitely reaches a result desirable from the public's viewpoint without
inflicting undue harm on authors of underlying works. The judicial
derivative works exception begun by the Rohauer court should be ex-
panded along the lines of the statutory exception in order to bring the
next twenty-five years of the renewal provision's operation in line with
another medium falls outside the scope of the medium licensed in the grant, then such use
is infringing regardless of termination of the grant and regardless of the derivative works
exception. Such use is infringing because rights thereto never vested in the derivative
copyright holder.
' The statutory derivative works exception in § 203 will be of no importance until the
year 2013, since grants executed after January 1, 1978 may not be terminated until that
date. The exception in § 304, however, is immediately important since grants under that
section may be subject to termination now. Furthermore, terminations occurring as a result
of failure of renewal vesting under the 1909 Act, supra note 1, will be of importance for
another 25 years or so.
' H.R. REP., supra note 16, at 134.
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modern copyright necessities. This would, of course, serve to elaborate
many of the distinctions required for analysis and operation of the 1976
Act's exceptions.
Professor Kaplan has observed that we "ought to recognize clearly
that any increment of benefit to the author and publisher achieved by
prolonging the period of protection is quite soon outrun by the burden
imposed on others.""' The same is true of the scope of rights granted by
copyright. The derivative works exception may, if broadly interpreted,
be a very powerful tool for lifting the burden imposed on the public and
on derivative users.
2' B. KAPLAN, supra note 43, at 115.
